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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
THE MASS DEMONSTRATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The mass demonstration has frequently been a means for the expres-
sion of minority opinion.' In the United States, its use has been especially
prevalent during the last decade. The emerging civil rights movement
has used the demonstration to communicate the inadequate development
of racial equality in the United States. Such demonstrations as sit-ins, cru-
sade-type marches, all-night vigils, and picketing, are commonly associated
with the civil rights movement. Since the United States involvement in
Vietnam has become an internal crisis in the American political arena,
peace demonstrations have taken a portion of the "spotlight" from civil
rights demonstrations,' although the two are sometimes interrelated.'
From speeches by "peace-niks"4 and public draft card burnings, to mas-
sive marches on Washington, demonstrations of dissent on the Vietnam
issue have captured a great deal of attention. The purpose of this paper
is to analyze the mass demonstration as a mode of political expression,'
assess the constitutional basis of the demonstration, recognize the per-
missible restrictions,7 and generally, communicate the desirability and
necessity of the mass demonstration as a means of petitioning the govern-
ment.
II. THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC FORUM.
A. Development of a Hierarchy of First Amendment Rights
Probably the first Supreme Court discussion of the right to a public
forum occurred in 1897 with its decision in Davis v. Massachusetts.' A
Baptist minister was preaching the gospel in the Boston Common with-
out first obtaining a permit from the mayor, as required by statute. His
subsequent conviction finally reached the United States Supreme Court.
However, the Court's decision favored the power of the state to pass such
provisions:
1 See A. EzboNI, DEMONSTRATION DEmOcRACY (1968).
2 See FI iAN and MAcAULAY, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and the World
of Public Officials, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 632.
3 Statement by Martin Luther King, Jr. that the war in Vietnam must be stopped to secure
internal order. N. Y. Times, July 3, 1965, p. 6, col. 2.
4 See the poems of Allen Ginsberg.
r Some of the first reported draft card burnings were in 1965. N. Y. Times, Oct. 19,
1965, p. 5 cols. 1, 4.
0 See Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly in Streets and other Public Places, 19 GEo.
WASH. L REv. 637 (1951).
7 See Comment, Limitations on the Right of Assembly, 23 CALIF. I. REV. 180 (1935).
8 167 U. S. 43 (1897).
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When no proprietary rights interfere, the legislature may end the right of
the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedica-
tion to public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting the public
use to certain purposes.9
At this first instance the right to a public forum did not receive favored
treatment. However, in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion,'" the Supreme Court indicated that public streets and public places
could be used by citizens for communication of views on national ques-
tions.1 This privilege of citizenship, however, was deemed to be a relative
one and only exerciseable in "subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must
not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied."' 2  The Court's
holding seems to be a somewhat awkward endorsement of the "privilege"
to use public places for communicating views on national questions. It
would appear that regulation would necessarily abridge, if not deny, this
privilege. However, it is generally felt that the Hague decision stands
for the proposition that the public does have a basic constitutional right
to use the streets, parks and public places in the exercise of first amend-
ment rights.13
Even in the public arena, certain types of expression are not pro-
tected. 4 One such type includes words "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'15 How-
ever, even this "fighting words" concept has been subject to limitation.
In Terminiello v. City of Chicago,:' Mr. Justice Douglas, for the ma-
jority, noted that
a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condi-
tion of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.' 7
9 The Supreme Court agreed with the opinion of then Judge Holmes, printed at 162 Mass.
at 510, 39 N. E. at 113.
10 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
11 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943), made it dear that the implication to the con-
trary in Davis was overruled.
12307 U. S. at 515-516.
13 See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S.
290 (1951); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); I T. EMERSON, D. HABER, N.
DORSEN, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 426 n. 1 (1967).
14 Generally these types are the following: "lewd and obscene," Roth v. United States, 354
U. S. 476, 484 (1957); "defamatory," Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952);
and "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942).
The Supreme Court has established a high priority for political speech among first amend-
ment rights. This high priority was adequately expressed in New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254, where speech that was libelous--and unprotected-was nonetheless protected
if the expressions were on major public issues.
15 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942); see CHAPEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATEs 149 (1941).
16 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
17Id. at 4.
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It is submitted that this function of free speech, recognized by the Court
in Terminiello, is peculiarly characteristic of petitioning speech. A peti-
tion for redress often is meant to "induce unrest," "create dissatisfaction,"
and "stir people to anger." The established purpose of the petitioning
is to induce a change of position-a redress of present grievances. Any
form of petitioning would appear to represent a part of this provocative
function of free speech.
Justice Douglas went on to state that even though freedom of speech
is not absolute "[ilt is nevertheless protected against censorship or pun-
ishment, unless shown likely to produce a dear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or unrest ... "18 It appears that petitioning is, by its very nature,
a form of free speech which necessarily invites dispute. The question
then becomes, whether the acknowledged value in being permitted to
petition the government, outweighs the substantive evil that the dispute
it invites, may turn out to be a violent one.
In Feiner v. New York, 19 the Supreme Court dealt with the conflict
between the criminal offense of disorderly conduct and the first amend-
ment freedom of expression. The case involved a speech given on a
street corner to a crowd of about seventy-five or eighty people, both
Negro and white. After one person in the crowd threatened violence,
two policemen demanded that the speaker stop his speech due to the pro-
pensity of violence. The speaker refused and was arrested for disorderly
conduct. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the majority opinion upholding
the conviction. He stated that it was necessary to determine whether
a clear and present danger of disorder was threatened. This statement
brings to mind the test applied in Terminiello, where the court stated that
freedom of speech is protected "unless shown likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest . . (emphasis supplied).
It appears questionable whether Feiner's speech, which indeed may have
threatened some "disorder," was enough to threaten a "serious substantive
evil." In fact, it is more likely that if the individual threatening violence
caused a disorder, it was more closely akin to the "public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest" classification. However, the Supreme Court, not-
ing its respect for the community interest in maintaining peace and order
on its streets, stated that the conviction did not encroach upon Feiner's
constitutional rights. The Court then expressed what appears to be its
test:
When as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion
18 Id.
10 340 U. S. 315 (1951).
20 Note 16 supra.
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and undertakes incitement to riot, they (the police) are powerless to
prevent a breach of the peace.21
Justice Black, dissenting, read the facts differently, i.e., violence did
not appear to be as imminent. However, Justice Black went further and
added:
Moreover, assuming that the 'facts' did indicate a critical situation, I re-
ject the implication of the court's opinion that the police had no obligation
to protect petitioner's constitutional right to talk. The police of course
have power to prevent breaches of the peace. But if, in the name of pre-
serving order, they can interfere even with a lawful public speaker, they
first must make all reasonable efforts to protect him.22
Black's dissent in Feiner indicates his high regard for freedom of
speech. However, his view in later cases, where the expression is not made
in the form of pure speech is quite different.
In Edwards v. South Carolina,23 two hundred Negro students walked
single file and two abreast through the grounds of the State Capital in
Columbia, South Carolina, protesting segregation. After thirty to forty-
five minutes of demonstrating, the police told the marchers to disperse.
After refusing, petitioners were arrested and convicted for breach of the
peace. The convictions were set aside. Mr. Justice Stewart, for the ma-
jority, stated: "The circumstances in this case reflect an exercise of these
basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form."' 4  He
then described the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government
for a redress of grievances. The emphasis, as usual, was primarily upon
whether or not there was violence. Since there was no violence, Justice
Stewart looked to Terminiello and quoted: "The Fourteenth Amendment
does not permit a state to make criminal the peaceful expression of un-
popular views .... -25 The peaceful demonstration was recognized as an
acceptable petitioning for a redress of grievances within the first amend-
ment.
Cox v. Louisiana26 involved another civil rights demonstration. This
one was before the courthouse in downtown Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
The demonstrators were convicted for breach of the peace. The police
had decided to arrest them when indications were that the demonstrators
at the courthouse also were to picket lunch counters. On the basis of
Edwards v. South Carolina, Justice Goldberg, for the Court, stated that it
was dear that the conviction infringed Cox's rights of free speech and
21 340 U. S. at 321.
22 Id. at 326.
23 372 U. S. 229 (1963).
24 Id. at 235.
251d. at 237.
26 379 U. S. 536 (1965).
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free assembly.27  He further noted that "[mlaintenance of the opportun-
ity for free political discussion is a basic tenet of our constitutional de-
mocracy. ' 28
In a concurrence, Justice Black explicidtly set out his distinction be-
tween the regulation of conduct-patrolling and marching-and speech.
He stated that regulating conduct
... would be constitutional, subject only to the condition that if such a
law had the effect of indirectly impinging on freedom of speech, press,
or religion, it would be unconstitutional if under the circumstances it ap-
peared that the State's interest in suppressing the conduct was not suffi-
cient to outweigh the individual's interest in engaging in conduct dosely
involving his First Amendment freedoms.29
To say the least, this is a confusing statement. Justice Black seems to
say that conduct-as distinguished from pure speech-may be constitu-
tionally regulated but if (1) the law indirectly impinged the freedom
of speech, press or religion, and (2) it appeared that the State's interest
in suppression did not outweigh the individual's first amendment interest,
the law would be unconstitutional. Black appears to be placing symbolic
speech-notice he omits the right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for a redress of grievances-in just the opposite position of
pure speech. He seems to lower the hierarchal preference when the ex-
pression is other than verbal. Black goes on to state:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from govern-
ment, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press and
assembly where people have a right to he for such purposes30
Black, who is a so called absolutionist, appears to be, "writing in" limita-
tions on first amendment freedoms. He makes an absolute statement-
"take away .... all power to restrict"-and then he adds, with emphasis,
the phrase "where people have a right to be for such purposes." It seems
unlikely that his statement is internally consistent. It would appear that
the mere determination of where people have a right to be may itself
be a rather monumental restriction on first amendment rights. No such
requirement is apparent from reading the first amendment.31
The emphasis above upon the confusing reasoning of Justice Black
is due to the more recent case in the demonstration area of Adderly v.
Florida32 Petitioners, Harriett Louise Adderly and thirty-one other per-
sons, were convicted by a jury on a charge of "trespass with a malicious
271d.
281d. at 574.
201d. at 577.
3oId. at 578.
31 U. S. CoNsT. amend. I.
32 385 U. S. 39 (1966).
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and mischievous intent" upon the premises of the county jail contrary
to a Florida statute. Justice Black delivered the opinion.
In distinguishing Edwards v. South Carolina,3 Black placed some
emphasis upon the fact that Adderly involved a jail and Edwards in-
volved the state capitalf 4  His distinction was as to traditional use or
purpose: "capital grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for security
purposes, are not." Black, then, distinguished the modes of entrance to
the public grounds-in Edwards, the demonstrators "went through a pub-
lic driveway," while in Adderly, they "entered the jail grounds through
a driveway used only for jail purposes and without warning to or permis-
sion from the sheriff." 5 "More importantly," Justice Black distinguished
the particular sanctions used in the two factual situations. In Edwards,
South Carolina had prosecuted the demonstrators with the common law
crime of breach of the peace. In Adderly, Florida used a trespass sta-
tute which Black deemed not to be as "indefinite, loose, and broad" as
the breach of the peace charge. Thus, the Florida statute was not chal-
lengeable on grounds of vagueness. Of course, an assessment of whether
the statute was unconstitutionally vague, is not the only way that the
conviction could be held to deny the petitioners their first amendment
rights. Therefore, Black discussed the application of the statute by the
sheriff and described it as "even-handed enforcement."'8  He then stated,
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedi-
cated. For this reason there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that
they had a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail cus-
todian's objections, because this area chosen for the peaceful civil rights
demonstration was not only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropri-
ate.... Such an argument has as its major unarticulated premise the as-
sumption that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a
constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they
please. That concept of constitutional law was vigorously and forth-
rightly rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely on, Cox v. Louisiana,
Supra, at 554-555 and 563-564. We reject it again.37
It seems that Adderly is indeed an endorsement of state "governmen-
tal power to restrict freedom of speech, . . . and assembly."3 8  Since the
trespass statute sanctioned conduct rather than pure speech, perhaps Jus-
33 Note 23 supra.
3 4 This point is connected to his idea of freedom "where people have a right to be for
such purposes."
35 385 U. S. at 41. Justice Black is apparently distinguishing the cases on the distinction
of "unrestricted public use" versus "limited public use."
38 385 U. S. at 47. This seems to leave an implication that if the statute is not uncon-
stitutionally vague on its face, then the only question is whether or not it is administered dis-
criminatorily. This sounds more like an equal protection analysis than a first amendment one.
37 385 U. S. at 47-48.
38379 U. S. at 577.
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tice Black's test for constitutionally regulating conduct could have been
used.3" Conduct may be constitutionally regulated but if the law indi-
rectly impinges first amendment rights and the state's interest in suppres-
sion does not outweigh the first amendment interest, the law is unconsti-
tutional.40 The proscribed conduct in Adderly was "malicious trespass"
-petitioners remaining on jail grounds after the sheriff demanded them
to leave. Is there any question that this law at least, indirectly impinged
the petitioners' first amendment right of peaceable assembly? It appears
clear that this law directly restricted petitioners rights. However, this
would not be sufficient under Justice Black's test. It also must appear that
the State's interest in suppression does not outweigh the first amendment
interest. How is one to balance these interests? Justice Black's statement
that there is not a constitutional right to propagandize protests "when-
ever," "however," and "wherever," is an indication for some standards of
analysis. The presumption seems to be in favor of the constitutionality of
the law. First, there is not an absolute right. Also, "-[the United States
Constitution does not forbid a state to control the use of its own property
for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose." 41 Perhaps, a reliance upon
intelligent police administration is the only thing that can give substance
to first amendment rights and the possiblity of misuse by officers should
not be a sufficient reason to deny a state the power to perform its func-
tions.42  At least, it seems clear that the sheriff in Adderly was not under
an obligation to protect the petitioners right to peaceably assemble or
even make all reasonable efforts to protect them 3 Thus, it appears that
where the expressions are made by conduct rather than "pure speech,"
the first amendment right is not as "absolute." In fact, under Justice
Black's apparent test, a presumption seems to lie in favor of the constitu-
tionality of the regulation of conduct. Notice, in Justice Black's state-
ment that the 'Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of
its own property for its own nondiscriminatory purpose," discriminatory
use of the property is tacitly approved. It is only the state's purpose
which must be nondiscriminatory. This statement appears to open the
door fairly wide for state regulation of demonstrations on public property.
This type of analysis presumptively condemns expression or petitioning
through conduct rather than "pure speech." This appears to be so, even
though petitioning through more "acceptable" modes, i.e., using "pure
speech" may be completely ineffective as a communication 44 Even though
40 Id.
41 385 U. S. at 48.
42 340 U. S. at 275-276 (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U. S. 268 (1950) and Kunz v. New York, 340U. S. 290 (1950)).
43 Compare Justice Black's dissent in Feiner, 340 U. S. at 326.
4- This brings to mind the elementary general science discussion of whether there is sound
if there is no one to hear.
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a peaceful demonstration can be an exercise of basic constitutional rights
"in their most pristine and classic form,"" the Court appears to have
adopted the view that this exercise of basic rights must be "where people
have a right to be for such purposes. ' 40  At least, in the case of mass
demonstration in Washington, D.C., it would not appear consistent with
our system to say that people do not have a right to exercise their right
to peaceably assemble there. Perhaps then, in the Washington, D.C. situa-
tion, Justice Black's analysis in Adderly is not controlling. Clearly, Wash-
ington, D.C. is open to the public and its streets could be used.47 How-
ever, in Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police,48 the district
court held that Congress had the power to make reasonable limitations on
the exercise of freedom of speech and assembly. These basic rights were
stated not to mean "that everyone with opinions to express may assemble
and speak at any public place and at any time."49  The restrictions in
Rankin were reasonable because they insured "'non-interference with the
work of the legislature, the maintenance of free movement of tourists and
visitors into and around the seat of government and protection of land-
scape."50  In Coppock v. Patterson,5 a Mississippi district court stated
the apparent rationale of restricting the right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government. It stated that "[g]ubernatorial action, legislative
enactment, and judicial decision are not to turn on who at the moment
commands the largest organized crowd or the meanest public horangue or
the loudest speaking voice."5  Obviously, there is merit to this statement.
But, it seems that this rationale is not totally relevant to the right to com-
municate. Just because the legislative or judicial action should not de-
pend upon the loudest demonstration does not mean that the right to
demonstrate should therefore be restricted. The important element is the
right to communicate one's views to the government. This is not claim-
ing the right also encompasses the right to have the grievance settled.
The government is obviously unable to grant every request of its citizenry.
But this does not justify limiting the means by which the citizenry can
communicate its grievances to the government. The threats or boisterous
activity of a crowd should not dictate governmental decision-making but
the representatives of the people should still listen to the crowds and as-
sess their grievances. The distinguishing element is whether one empha-
sizes the character of the mass activity or the character of message that is
45 372 U. S. at 235.
46 Note 38, supra.
47 Whether or not Pennsylvania Avenue!
48 278 F. Supp. 233 (D. D. C. 1968).
491d. at 235.
5old.
51272 F. Supp. 16 (S. D. Miss. 1967).
52 Id. at 19.
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being communicated. Obviously, governmental action should not turn
upon the size or nature of a crowd, but it should have the possibility of
turning on the reason the crowd has formed. Fear of threatening crowds
should not cause government representatives to turn a deaf ear to the
pleas of its aggrieved citizenry. It would appear that a peaceful mass
demonstration at the national capital would be exercising the first amend-
ment right to communicate in its "pristine and classic form."
B. Recent "Public Forum" Developments
Amalgomated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.53 presented the question of whether peaceful picketing of a
business enterprise located within a shopping center can be enjoined on
the ground that it constitutes an unconsented invasion of the owner's
property rights. The court below had enjoined the picketing as a tres-
pass and the petitioners claimed that the injunction decision violated their
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. Justice Marshall, for the majority, started "from the prem-
ise that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the
public is .... protected by the First Amendment."" The particular limita-
tion of public speech and assembly involved was that concerning location
of the activity. The Adderly opinion had established that the location of
the expressive conduct was a prime factor in evaluating the extent of pro-
tection under the first amendment.55 If the location was publicly owned
and was generally used by the public, the petitioners could not have been
barred from exercising their first amendment rights.56 Therefore, to trans-
fer this privately owned shopping center into a permissible location for
peaceable assembly, the Court used the "public function" test of Marsh v.
Alabama.57  The shopping center was deemed to function as a "business
district."' The Court then noted the relevance of the "public use" of
the particular location.
Thus where property is not ordinarily open to the public, this Court has
held that access to it for the purpose of exercising First Amendment
rights may be denied altogether.59
However, the Adderly decision did not furnish support for the decision
in Logan Plaza "because it is clear that the public has virtually unre-
5 391 U. S. 308 (1967).
541d. at 313.
55 Note 32 supra.5 3Sce Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Hague v. C.I.O., supra note 10; Schneider
v. State, 308 U. S. 14 7(1939); Jamison v. Texas, supra note 11.
57 326 U. S. 501 (1946).
58391 U. S. at 319.
59 Id. at 320.
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stricted access to the property at issue here."6  Thus, the Supreme Court
seems to recognize the right to a public forum if the forum is located
where the public has been allowed unrestricted access. 1
Wolin v. Port of New York Authority 2 also involved using privately-
owned, publicly-used, property to disseminate political ideas. Wolin was
distributing political leaflets in the main concourse and other passage-
ways of the Terminal Building operated by the Port of New York Author-
ity. The Port Authority was apparently restraining this activity and Wolin
sought a declaratory judgment that he be permitted to distribute the leaf-
lets. A basic consideration as to the scope of Wolin's right to dissemi-
nate political ideas was a characterization of the particular location as
either public or private. If it were private and used for private purposes,
Wolin's right to use it as a public forum would "yield to the owner's
right to be protected against trespass or invasion of privacy. '0 3  If the
property was essentially dedicated to public use, the court reasoned that
"the citizen's fundamental right to freely express his views in a public
place" would be given presumptive validity. After referring to the right
to communicate ideas as a "bulwark of our free, democratic society,"64,
and a "sacred right,"6 5 the court indicated that the dedication of property
to public use "in effect dedicates it to the exercise by the public of Con-
stitutional rights, including the rights of free speech and assembly un-
der the First Amendment."66 These statements clearly denote a full rec-
ognition of the right to use public property as a public forum for the
communication of political thoughts and for petitioning for a redress of
grievances. However, the Wolin court refused to concede that this right
was absolute. Again, the oft-used, limiting language of Justice Goldberg
in Cox v. Louisiana,67 was cited as indicating that certain regulatory re-
strictions were permissible.
"The rights of free speech and assembly ... still do not mean that
everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any
public place and at any time."681
The competing function of the Terminal was a free flow of traffic which
was considered to be of lower priority under our constitutional scheme.69
Thus, Wolin's conduct was protected. The Wolin court also considered
obiter dicta, the possibility of restricting the constitutional right due to
601d. at 321.
6 1 Justice Black, along with Justices White and Harlan dissented.
62 268 F. Supp. 855 (1967).
68 Id. at 859, citing Adderly v. Florida, supra note 32.
64 268 F. Supp. at 859.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 860.
67 Note 26 s.pra.
68 379 U. S. at 554.
69 268 F. Supp. at 862.
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probabilities of a provocation of violence or rioting. This portion of the
opinion seems particularly applicable to the use of the mass demonstra-
tion as a mode of communicating a political viewpoint. The defendants
argued that the controversial nature of the subject matter would lead to
violence or rioting, particularly since the Terminal was frequented by
members of the armed services. The court recognized the validity of the
defendants concern but stated:
[h]owever it is the very expression of views with respect to controversial
political issues that most requires protection under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, however distasteful such views may be to certain
segments of our society. The right of free public expression on political is-
sues is too dearly prized to be curtailed without equally important public
cause. Such suppression would be the first step toward ultimate stagna-
tion of essential debate.70
It is noteworthy that the court cited Edwards v. South Carolina," an ex-
ercise of peaceable assembly and petition of the government for a redress
of grievances case, in its most "pristine and classic" form, and not Termi-
niello v. Chicago7 2 a pure speech case.7" However, Wolin did involve the
passing out of leaflets which may be considered more passive than a mass
demonstration.
In Tinker v. Des Mloines Independent Community School Dist.7 , the
Supreme Court considered the right of high school students to wear black
armbands during school time to publicize their objections to the hostilities
in Vietnam. Surprisingly, Justice Fortas stated that the concern here was
not "aggressive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations . . . [but]
primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure speech.' "7 Although the
Court held that the wearing of armbands was a protected expression, it
seems somewhat awkward to call it "pure" speech. Justice Fortas in stat-
ing the issue assumes that this conduct is "akin to 'pure speech'." Even
Justice Black, dissenting, does not expressly argue this point but appears to
accept it only arguendo in order to concentrate on the "location" factor,
i.e., in a public school. 76 On the location element, Justice Fortas stated
that "free speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed
that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would
not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benev-
olent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots." 77 Although
701d. at 863.
71Note 23 supra.
72 Note 16 supra.
7 3 The value of the language in Edwards is evident since here it was cited for support in
a "pure" speech case.
74393 U. S. 503 (1969).
751d. at 508.
761d. at 516.
77 1d. at 513.
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this language is seen as upholding the constitutional right to a public
forum,7 8 it would appear that this statement is limited to "pure speech"
or conduct "akin to 'pure speech'," and does not support the mode of mass
demonstrations. Thus, the case seems to support only limited avenues of
expression even though Justice Fortas is particularly "benevolent" in at-
tacking the location limitation upon the free exercise of the right of ex-
pression. His original distinction reduces the mass demonstration to a
secondary position under the first amendment while the wearing of
black armbands is considered to be a primary first amendment right. In
fact, Fortas seems to give mass demonstrations an even lower priority than
"aggressive, disruptive action." 79  Perhaps, the best way to view Tinker
is that it successfully cut away at the location limitation and thus apparently
enlarged the scope of protected freedom of expression.
III. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
A. Washington, D.C. Riot Act
It is recognizable that demonstrations, although not pure speech, are
forms of self-expression. As mentioned, this particular form of self-
expression often conflicts with various other state interests. When this con-
flict is presented to the judicial process, courts generally apply a "balanc-
ing of interests" test to settle the dispute. When the participants in a
demonstration engage in violent conduct, the demonstration loses its first
amendment protection. 0 The government has a definite interest in pre-
venting physical damage to persons and property. Thus, the demonstra-
tion, even though recognized as an expression, does not receive the
favored judicial respect of pure speech and can consequently be restricted
by governmental provisions."- The reasonableness of these regulatory pro-
visions is generally determined by a balancing of the competing interests
of the demonstrators and the state. The cases that challenge these restric-
tive measures are usually concerned with either the provision itself or
how it was applied to the facts. Where the provision itself is challenged
the concepts of vagueness or indefiniteness, and overbreadth are the usual
doctrinal routes.82 The concept of vagueness refers to procedural due
process requirements, i.e., proper notice and fair adjudication. Overbreadth
refers to substantive due process where the issue is whether the regulatory
measure substantively prohibits the exercise of constitutionally protected
78 R. Hornung, The First Amendment Right to A Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L. J. 931, at
945.
79 "... or even group demonstrations." [emphasis supplied) see note 75 supra.
8 0 See, e.g. Feiner v. New York, supra note 19; Pritchard v. Davis, 326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.
1964); Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1967).
8 1 See Cox v. Louisiana, supra note 26.
82 See generally AMSTERDAM, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty, 40 CORNELL 1. REV. 195 (1955).
[Vol. 31
COMMENTS
freedoms.S3 Governmental provisions which restrict freedom of expression
are obviously subject to these concepts. The particular concern is that such
provisions may be worded so broadly that they discourage the exercise of
the freedoms of expression and assembly because people fear they may be
within the proscribed conduct.M The Supreme Court has indicated that
statutory measures which seek to regulate first amendment rights should
be narrowly drawn and strictly construed."0 Some courts have listed rel-
evant factors for determining whether a regulation meets these standards
of clarity and narrowness. In Landry v. Daley,"' the following factors are
listed: 7 (1) whether a substantial interest worthy of protection is apparent
from the language of the statute; (2) whether the terms of the regulation
are susceptible to objective measurement by men of common intelligence;88
(3) whether those charged with its enforcement are vested only with lim-
ited discretion; (4) whether its clarity is dependent upon manifold cross-
reference to inter-related enactments or regulations.
The particular regulatory provision of concern here is the criminal of-
fense of riot. In the context of a mass demonstration in this nation's
capital, a discussion of what conduct would be considered criminally riotous
seems appropriate. Necessarily, this consideration will also involve a con-
stitutional evaluation of the riot laws in terms of vagueness and over-
breadth. The offense of riot is firmly established as a limitation upon the
rights of people to assemble and demonstrate.8 9 This offense carries with
it penal sanctions. The District of Columbia crime of riot reads as fol-
lows:
(a) A riot in the District of Columbia is a public disturbance involving
an assemblage of five or more persons which by tumultuous and violent
conduct or the threat thereof creates grave danger of damage or injury to
property or persons.
(b) Whoever willfully engages in a riot in the District of Columbia shall
be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not
more than $1,000, or both.90
In United States v. Jeffries,"' the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia had occasion to consider the constitutionality of this riot statute. The
defendants there were charged with second-degree burglary, grand lar-
83 NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963).
84 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Button, supra note 83;
Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).8 
"Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 371 U. S. at 433.
80 280 F. Supp. 938 (N. D. I. 1968).
87 Id. at 952.
88 See Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967).
89 R. PERuuNs, CamINAL LAw 405 (1969).
00 WASH. D. C .CoDE ch. 22, §1122 (1967).
9145 F. R. D. 110 (D.D.C. 1968).
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ceny and willfully engaging in riot, following the April disorders in 1968.
The defendants challenged the riot statute "as unduly vague and so lack-
ing in criteria as to leave the public and the courts uncertain as to the
nature of the conduct prohibited." 92  The act requires (1) a public dis-
turbance; (2) an assemblage of five or more persons; (3) tumultuous
and violent conduct or the threat thereof; (4) the creation of grave dan-
ger of damage or injury to property or persons. However, the D.C. court
expressed the view that "the concept of vagueness requires regard for the
overall thrust of the statute."93  Thus, an evaluation of the definiteness
of each word used in the statute is not the recommended approach. With-
out discussing the terminology of the statute or the specificity of the pro-
scribed offense, the Jeffries court merely concluded that "[clertainly,
this statute neither forbids nor requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as its mean-
ing and differ in any substantial degree as to its application. '9 4  This
conclusionary holding appears to lack an expressed analysis and thus re-
quires further consideration. Perhaps the factors set down in Landry v.
Daley,9" would be helpful in determining the clarity and narrowness of
the statute. Is there a substantial interest worthy of protection which is
apparent from the language of the statute? The court in Jeffries stated
that the statute was "cast in terms of 'riot' so that the words must be read
in that context ..... " Thus, the apparent substantial interest, as ex-
pressed by the District of Columbia District Court, is merely the prohibition
of riots. Unfortunately, such a statement of the interest worthy of protec-
tion is not overly revealing as to the court's underlying reasoning. Thus,
one must study the language of the statute to determine the interest to be
protected. The words "tumultuous and violent conduct" and "danger of
damage or injury to property" indicate a concern for deterring injuries
to persons and property due to violent activities. This appears to be a
substantial community interest worthy of protection."
Are the terms of the statute susceptible to objective measurement by
men of common intelligence? As mentioned, the court in Jeffries an-
swered this factor affirmatively.9 However, it appears that there may
be conduct at the periphery of the proscribed activity which may be con-
stitutionally protected. There is no requirement that the persons who are
indicted for rioting also be those persons who were engaged in "tumul-
tuous and violent" conduct. If several hundred people were to be con-
92Id. at 115.
93Id.
941d. at 115-16, citing Conally v. General Construction Company, 269 U. S. 385 (1926).
9 5 Note 86 supra.
9645 F. R. D. at 115.
97 See Feiner v. New York supra note 19.
0845 F. R. D. at 115.
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ducting a vigil or death march and several hundred others began a
counter-demonstration throwing rocks and bottles, i.e., a "grave danger
of damage or injury to property or persons," would those participating in
the march be guilty of the offense of riot? Subsection (b) of the statute
requires willful intent to "engage in a riot." Do the participants meet
this requirement? Does the word assemblage only include those partici-
pating with a common intent? The Jeffries court does not deal with this
question but it does state that the words "challenged in the statute have
an accepted common law meaning."99
Interpolating the common law definition of riot into the Washington,
D.C. code version should mean that those guilty of riot must be acting
with a common intent to engage in riotous activity. This factor appears
to increase the likelihood that those peaceably assembled, although their
presence stirs others to riotous conduct, would not be within the proscribed
conduct. The crucial issue, however, is assuming those who participated
in the demonstration exhibited a common intent to cause unrest and dis-
pute within the community, is that intent enough to make them partici-
pants in the riot. This is where it becomes necessary for the courts to
distinguish the intent or purpose of the movement from the intent ex-
pressed in the particular demonstration. The purpose or intent of the
peace movement is to stir people to action in hopes of effecting a change in
governmental policy. The movement itself and its underlying purposes
obviously stir up dispute in the community. However, the demonstration
is intended to be a form of communication. It is expressing the view of
the movement through attention-gaining conduct. The specific intent of
the demonstrators is to express a view. Just because that view happens,
to create dispute and dissatisfaction in the community is no reason to con-
demn the form of expression as riotous or its participants as rioters. In
fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that a "function of free speech
under our system is to invite dispute."'100 The demonstration is a form of,
free expression and thus may legally invite dispute. Therefore, courts
should not confuse the purpose of the over-all involvement, which indeed
may, at times, seem to be evidence of riotous intent, with the intent to ex-
press a view in the form of demonstrations. The overt act of demon-
90 Id. A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons act-
ing together (a) in the commission of a crime by open force, or (b) in the execution
of some enterprise, lawful or unlawful, in such a violent, turbulent and unauthor-
ized manner as to create likelihood of public terror and alarm.
IL PERmKINS, CxImruAL LAw 405 (1969); also, Judge Stephens is quoted as including "persons
assembled and acting with common intent" 38 Del. 322, 326, 192 A. 550, 551-2 (1937),
cited in PER Ns, supra, n.29, at 405.
In an appendix to its opinion the Jeffries court did indicate that it was not necessary for
the members of the assemblage to have acted pursuant to an agreement or plan made in
advance. Also, the court noted, in a separate opinion, that the defendants, were liable to a joint
trial on the charge of engaging in a riot. 45 F.R.D. 119 (1968); FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). 14.
100 Sce Terminiello v. City of Chicago supra note 16, at 4.
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strating is not done with riotous intent but merely with the intent to ex-
press a political opinion and it is that overt act which either is riotous or
not. A literal reading of the riot statute makes it appear that if five or
more persons are conducting a death march and two or three others "jump"
them and tumultuous and violent conduct creates substantial dangers of
damage, one is free to say that the march itself was a riot. However, sub-
section (b) requires "willful" engagement in a riot and obviously the
marchers would not evidence the required intent. Although the "sus-
ceptibility of objective measurement by men of common intelligence" test
obviously refers to those who intend to participate in a demonstration, the
actual measurement of intent may be made by the policeman on the beat,
whether or not objectively. As mentioned, the Jeffries court expressly
stated that the D.C. riot act met the requirements of this test. Moreover,
the question of intent will probably be left to the judicial process in its
usual fashion.
The third factor was dealt with in part in discussing the preceding
factor. Are those charged with enforcement of the act vested only with
limited discretion? It is here that the "intent" distinctions previously dis-
cussed are important. If the policeman at the scene has complete discre-
tion to assess the intent of the demonstrators then this test is not met.
The statute itself does not mention police discretion. However, its word-
ing may necessarily require the implementation of wide police latitude in
enforcement. There must be a determination of whether there is a public
disturbance involving five or more persons, whether there is tumultuous
and violent conduct, and whether grave danger of personal or property
damage is created. Initially, police discretion must be relied upon to in-
terpret and apply these terms. There is ample room for flexibility in
determining whether a "public disturbance" has occurred and also whether
there is "tumultuous and violent conduct" likely to create danger to persons
and property. Intent to riot must be established and perhaps this is the
saving factor which keeps the statute from giving unlimited discretion to
enforcement officers.
The fourth factor, mentioned in Landry v. Daley,10' is whether its
clarity is dependent upon cross-references to inter-related enactments or
regulations."°2 The Washington, D.C. Code does not attempt to define
"public disturbance" or "tumultuous and violent conduct." Thus, there is a
certain lack of clarity concerning the scope of these terms. However,
this lack of clarity is not based upon the necessity of cross-referencing in
the Code. The lack of dependence upon various other sections of the
Washington D.C. Code to determine the proscribed conduct is convincing
evidence of compliance with this factor.
101 Note 86 supra.
102 It may require cross-referendng in case law and commentaries for common law defini-
tions.
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From the above analysis it appears that the Washington, D.C. riot
statute probably would be upheld. It is indeed questionable whether pres-
ent modes of attack upon statutory restrictions are adequate. The statute
may be drawn narrowly and with clarity and nevertheless restrict pro-
tected first amendment rights. Perhaps, the courts should concentrate on
the right to effectively disseminate political ideas as a fundamental right,10 3
rather than proving a particular doctrinal mode of attacking a statute.
Where a first amendment right is being subjected to curtailment under
the guise of a criminal law, the "evil that may be collateral to the exer-
cise of the right must be isolated and defined in a 'narrowly drawn' statute
lest the power to control excesses of conduct be used to suppress the con-
stitutional right itself. . ,u14 The preservation of the constitutional
right should be the acknowledged first premise in each analysis. By al-
lowing peaceful petitioning to be suppressed, "we only increase the forces
of frustration which the conditions of second-class citizenship are generat-
ing amongst us."'01 5
B. The Right to Travel Across State Lines.
The right to use the national capital as a public forum to communi-
cate grievances concerning governmental policy would be largely handi-
capped if people from outside the capital were unable to travel to Wash-
ington. The right to travel across state lines for many purposes has
been generally taken for granted in the United States. Generally, the re-
strictions upon traveling across state lines have concerned commercial
items,106 immoral practices,'10 7 and have also been means of implementing
standards of racial equality.108 The concern here is with possible restric-
tions upon the traveling of people from their home state fo chosen loca-
tions for the purpose of petitioning the government through mass demon-
stration. The right to travel from one state to another has been recognized
as a constitutional right which "occupies a position fundamental to the
concept of our Federal Union."'0 9 The right is not expressly mentioned in
the Constitution. The specific constitutional provision, the penumbra of
which is the source of this recognized right, has varied in the cases." 0
10 3 For example, "[ija general, overbreadth attacks are allowed for the exercise of a particu-
lar right of 'pure' speech as distinguished from conduct." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,
296 (1967). "'[H~ard core' conduct applies only where the attack is for vagueness." Wright
v. City of Montgomery, 282 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
104 Adderly v. Florida rupra note 32 at 55 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
105Id. at 56.
100 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
107 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
108 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
100 United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757 (1966).
110 Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941) (privileges and immunities of the four-
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The Supreme Court has indicated that provisions which tend to interfere
with this "fundamental" right, should have their constitutionality "judged
by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest."
Thus, the right to travel from one's home state to the nation's capital
in order to petition the government for a redress of grievances should be
protected and any classifications which hinder that right must be compel-
ling to withstand constitutional inquiry. In 1968 Congress passed Title I
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Section 2101 concerns riots and people
who "'travel in interstate commerce . . .with intent to incite a riot."11
This statutory provision obviously restricts the fundamental right to
travel across state lines. Therefore, it represents a possible limitation
upon the right to petition the government through the mass demonstra-
tion medium. The proscribed conduct is traveling "in interstate or foreign
commerce." However, this conduct must be accompanied by an intent:
(1) to incite a riot; or (2) to organize, promote, encourage, participate in,
or carry on a riot; or (3) to commit any act of violence in furtherance
of a riot; or (4). to aid or abet any person in inciting or participating in
or carrying on a riot; and who either during the course of any such travel
or use or thereafter performs or attempts to perform any other overt act
for any purpose specified. Section 2102 is the definitional section. Un-
der section 2102(b) the term "incite to riot" is deemed not to include
the "mere oral or written (1) advocacy of ideas or (2) expression of be-
lief." It is noteworthy that this provision also appears to distinguish
between "pure speech" and "speech-plus." Apparently, the term "'incite to
riot" may very well include the use of conduct to advocate ideas or ex-
press beliefs.
Under the doctrine of United States v. Guest"' this federal statutory
provision must represent "a compelling state interest" in order to with-
stand constitutional attack. Thus, it would appear that courts should
require a specific showing of a clear violation before one's right to
travel would be deemed criminal. The question of intent is again the key
issue. As mentioned in regard to the Washington, D.C. riot statute,
there may be a tendency to confuse the purpose of the act itself and the
general purpose of the "movement" perpetrating the act. People may
indeed believe and profess that our system of government should be
radically changed through any means, but this fact should not make their
interstate travel to peaceably petition the government a criminal act un-
der federal law. The statute itself appears to provide an avenue for sup-
pressing effective means of petitioning the government and thus should
be suspect. It obviously restricts the right to travel-a fundamental right.
teenth amendment, also, the commerce clause); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 125 (1958)
(fifth amendment due process).
111 18 U. S. C. §§ 2101-2102, (1968).
112 Note 109 supra.
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In the case of mass demonstrations at the nation's capital, it is likely to re-
strict the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for a
redress of grievances-a first amendment right. Thus, in the context of
the mass demonstration, sections 2101 and 2102 represent a double threat
to rights that are fundamental to our system of government. How com-
pelling can the required "compelling interest" be to outweigh these pro-
tected rights? Surely, this statute should be suspect and the burden of
proving specific intent and clear violation should be made extremely dif-
ficult.
IV. CONCLUSION.
The concept of the political demonstration involves elements of free
speech, free assembly, free petitioning of the government, free press, and
free travel. It also represents the right of people to have a public forum
for the dissemination of political views. This concept is particularly im-
portant for the protection of "minorities and to allow them to be heard as
they are really the only ones who need the protection of the First Amend-
ment. . . .""' The importance of being able to express political views
and petition for redress of grievance cannot be overemphasized.
Ultimately, a society which fails to respond effectively to its members, es-
pecially when the neglect of the needs of some of them has been accumu-
lating and has been repeatedly called to its attention, will have little choice
except between anarchy and tyranny. Demonstrations are a useful
though potentially volatile warning mechanism. Muffling their sound
will not prevent the explosion."14
The rich and the influential have easy access to mass communication
media and have no problem in disseminating their ideas." 5 The Consti-
tution should not be used to support the perpetuation of limiting access
to effective petitioning. Contrarily, it should be the protector of those
who are unable to match the powers of the rich and well-known.
Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut
off to large groups of our citizens. . . . Their methods should not be
condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment as long as the as-
sembly and petition are peaceable .... 316
Thus, as long as the location of the protest is public in nature and the
demonstration itself is peaceful, the right to assemble and petition the
government through this mode should receive nearly absolute protection.
It has been suggested that the primary purpose of the first amendment is
11 Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly in Streets and Other Public Places, 19 GEo.
WAsH. L J. 637, 639 (1951).
114 A. ETZIONr, DEmONSTRATION DEMocRAcY 66 (1968).
115 Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, at 11.
116Adderly v. Florida, supra note 32 at 50 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas).
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"to guarantee the maintenance of an effective system of free expression."' 117
Our society is seeking certain values by protecting the right to freedom
of expression. Some of these values are (1) assurance of individual self-
fulfillment, (2) attainment of the truth, (3) securing participation by
the members of society in social decision-making, and (4) maintaining a
balance between stability and change in our society." 8 It is submitted
that protecting the available means for petitioning the government is con-
sistent with all of these values. The power of a person to realize his po-
tentiality and to communicate his views are bound-up in gaining individ-
ual self-fulfillment. Allowing another viewpoint to be heard is an ac-
cepted means of attaining truth.' 9  Obviously, hampering an available
avenue of expression would be limiting the chances of attaining truth.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in -ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.... That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 20
The mass demonstration to petition the government is particularly in tune
with the third desired value. It obviously secures wider participation by
the members of society in social-decision-making. Protecting the demon.
stration as a free expression also is consistent with maintaining a balance
between stability and change. The changes that are necessary for the
continuation of a society must be known in order that rational action
can be taken. The concept of free expression advocates the preservation of
all modes of expression so that social man will not be ignorant of the
needs of his society. The neglect of social needs may lead to radical change
and destruction of stability. Thus, every effort should be made not to
"muffle" the sounds of warnings by suppressing available means of com-
munication. The right to communicate ideas through speech and protests
"must carry with it the opportunity to win the attention of the public.'1 2'
A. Mark Segreti
117T. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877,
878 (1963).
118Id. at 878-879.
119 This assumes the proposition that the more views expressed on a subject the more
likely one is to gain the truth.
120 Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Holmes).
121 University Committee to End War In Vietnam v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469, 477 (W. D.
Tex. 1968).
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